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identification of the authorized sellers who breached
their distribution contracts. The retailers responded by
submitting affidavits stating that they did not obliterate
the batch codes from any JPMS products. JPMS argued
that even if the retailers were not responsible for the
obliteration, they knew that this action precluded JPMS
from tracing the product to those parties responsible for
the illicit distribution. However, the court held that the
defendant retailers had no duty to disclose the missing
batch codes to JPMS. As a result, the court held that
JPMS presented insufficient evidence to prove conceal-
ment by the retailers. Accordingly, the court dismissed
the fraud claim.
Conclusion
The court denied in part and granted in part the
retailers motions for summary judgment and dismissal.
The court found that the obliteration of the batch codes
resulted in Paul Mitchell products materially different
from JPMS authorized products. This caused a likeli-
hood of consumer confusion regarding the origin of the
Paul Mitchell products sold by the retailers. The court,
therefore, denied summary judgment and dismissal on
the first Lanham Act claim and the unfair competition
claim. The court dismissed the second claim, but only
because this claim proved too similar to the Lanham Act
claim to form an independent claim. The defendant
retailers were not the only ones involved in taking Paul
Mitchell products out of the JPMS distribution network.
Thus, JPMS could not establish that the defendant
retailers instigated the unauthorized distribution or that
they obliterated the batch codes. The court was unwill-
ing to hold the retailers liable for mere awareness of
such activities. Consequently, the court dismissed the
tortious interference and fraud claims.
The statute of limitations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act is strictly construed
by Linda A. Kerns
Consumers seeking to file a claim
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA") must strictly adhere to the
statute of limitations unless their
claim meets a narrowly construed
discovery exception. In Clark v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty
Insurance Co., 54 E3d 669 (10th
Cir. 1995), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding
that a "general discovery exception"
to the statute of limitations would be
contrary to Congress' express
intention. To ensure a consumer's
privacy, the FCRA provides limited
circumstances where credit reports
may be furnished and specified
instances where consumers must be
notified if their credit report is
issued. The statute of limitations
under the FCRA will only be
extended if a credit report is issued,
is required to be disclosed to the
consumer, and contains a willful and
material misrepresentation.
Credit report obtained
without consumer's
consent
The plaintiffs, Robert and Billie
Clark ("the Clarks"), filed an action
against State Farm Fire & Casualty
Insurance Company ("State Farm")
seeking actual and punitive dam-
ages. The Clarks alleged that State
Farm violated the FCRA when it
obtained the Clarks' credit report
without their consent on July 25,
1989. State Farm procured the report
in connection with a separate
investigation which involved the
alleged destruction by arson of a
piece of property that the Clarks had
sold to a third party.
Narrow exception in
statute may extend tolling
period
The Clarks filed their complaint
on April 6, 1992, two years and
eight months after the credit report
was issued. State Farm filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that the
statute of limitations had run. The
FCRA requires that an action be
brought within two years from the
date on which the liability arises.
However, a claim may be brought at
any time within two years after the
consumer discovers the report if the
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consumer provides evidence that the
credit reporting agency willfully
misrepresented material information
that the FCRA requires to be
disclosed to the consumer. The
Clarks attempted to avoid the
express two year limitation by
claiming that they did not know that
the credit report had been issued
until 60 days after the two-year
period had lapsed. A claims file
requested in a discovery motion in a
separate lawsuit filed by Robert
Clark against State Farm included
the credit report at issue. The file
which State Farm provided the
Clarks in that case contained a credit
report, but the print was allegedly of
such poor quality that no one
discovered the existence of the
credit report. However, after the two
year statute of limitations had run, a
second report of better quality was
provided.
The case law conflicts regarding
the statute of limitations provided in
the FCRA. In Houghton v. Insurance
Crime Prevention, 795 F.2d 322 (3d
Cir. 1986), and Rylewicz v. Beaton,
888 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1989), the
courts held that a discovery excep-
tion may not be read into the FCRA
unless the credit reporting agency
materially and willfully misrepre-
sents information required to be
disclosed to the consumer. The
district court in Clark v. State Farm
relied on the above mentioned cases,
holding that tolling the statute of
limitations under the FCRA is
permissible in only one limited
"circumstance" of material and
willful misrepresentation.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has
taken a contrary position in Hyde v.
Hibernia National Bank, 861 F.2d
446 (5th Cir. 1988), finding that the
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statute of limitations under the
FCRA commences when a report
issued to a third party causes injury
to the consumer. If, however, the
consumer is not aware of the
issuance of the report, the limitation
period tolls until the consumer
becomes aware.
The Clarks relied on the reason-
ing in Hyde. However, the appellate
court found that Hyde did not
address the part of the FCRA which
the Clarks construed as favorable to
their case. This section states that
the "tolling" provision does not
apply to extend the limitation period
unless the information contained in
the consumer's credit report is
required to be disclosed to the
consumer.
Investigative consumer
report defined
The language of the FCRA
requires that the issuance of an
"investigative consumer report" be
disclosed to the consumer. The
Clarks claimed that the credit report
that State Farm requested and
received was an "investigative
consumer report," thereby triggering
the exception to the statute of
limitations. However, the district
court found, as a matter of fact, that
the consumer report at issue here
was not an "investigative consumer
report'" The district court noted that
an "investigative consumer report"
differs from a regular consumer
report because it contains general
information about the consumer's
character, reputation, personal
characteristics, mode of living, and
other information that is not
obtained directly from a creditor of
the consumer or from a consumer
reporting agency. The district court
found that the Clarks' consumer
credit report merely listed credit
transactions; therefore, nothing in
the report indicated that the report
was an "investigative consumer
report." The district court concluded
that the Clarks did not establish that
State Farm "materially and willfully
misrepresented any information
required.. . to be disclosed"
because they failed to prove that the
report was investigative. The Clarks
failed to qualify for an exception to
the two year limitation period
provided by the statute.
The appellate court relied on the
reasoning found in Houghton v.
Insurance Crime Prevention
Institute, 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3rd Cir.
1986), and concluded that an
equitable tolling or discovery period
may not be read into the FCRA. The
Supreme Court has stated that where
Congress has enunciated an excep-
tion to a general prohibition,
"additional exceptions are not to be
implied in the absence of evidence
of a contrary legislative intent."
Congress explicitly set forth one
discovery exception for the FCRA;
therefore, the appellate court
concluded that implying anything
more would be excessive and
against Congress' express intent.
Since no evidence supported the
Clarks' claim that the discovery
exception should apply to their case
and because the two year statute of
limitations had run, the appellate
court affirmed the district court in
barring the Clarks' claim. Congress
included a specific exception to the
statute of limitations in the FCRA,
and the Tenth Circuit refused to
expand the exception in Clark.
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A federal district court holds distributor's failure to
maintain manufacturer's quality control standards
possible violation of federal trademark law
by Paul Lukitsch
In Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
904 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1995), a United States
district court held that a distributor's unauthorized sale
of date-expired products could infringe a brewer's
trademark under federal trademark laws. In addition, in
reviewing the distributor's motion to dismiss the
brewer's claims, the court held that the "economic loss
rule," a rule under Florida law which prevents a tort
action from being maintained on purely economic
damages, does not bar a brewer's fraud claim where
damages include damages to the brewer's trademark.
Since May 1, 1983, Anthony Distributors ("An-
thony") has been engaged in distributor agreements with
Miller Brewing Company ("Miller"). These agreements
grant Anthony the exclusive right to distribute Miller
products, which bear the registered trademark of Miller,
in the Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg markets of Florida.
According to the terms set forth in the distributor
agreements, Anthony is required to uphold Miller's strict
quality control standards by preventing Miller products
with expired date codes from reaching consumers. To
ensure this control, Anthony must retrieve overage
products from all retail accounts and destroy the product
at their own expense.
Miller alleged that Anthony failed to comply with
the required quality control standards set forth in the
distributor agreements despite repeated warnings. Miller
insisted that Anthony's failure to comply with these
standards was due in part to a scheme by Anthony to
generate profits. Miller took the position that Anthony,
through its representatives, intended to fraudulently
deliver overage products to retail accounts by "slam-
ming, swapping, and dumping" the overage products to
increase sales. Miller believed that Anthony's failure to
comply with the quality control standards affected
Miller's ability to exercise control over products bearing
the Miller trademark. Miller alleged that Anthony's sale
of overage products damaged the goodwill of the Miller
trademark and allowed Anthony to earn profits to which
it was not entitled. Miller further alleged that Anthony
breached the distributor agreement, thereby causing
financial losses to Miller.
On May 8, 1995, Miller filed a seven count action in
the district court against Anthony, alleging breach of
contract, trademark infringement under federal law,
fraud, and unjust enrichment. In response to these
claims, Anthony filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
the economic loss doctrine barred Miller's tort claim of
fraud because Miller had only sustained pecuniary
damages but no property damages. Anthony further
contended that federal trademark law did not apply
because Anthony was an "authorized distributor"
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court looks
only to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint and
accepts all allegations as true. Here, the district court
allowed the claim based on federal trademark law,
holding that Anthony's status as an authorized distribu-
tor offered no protection from trademark infringement.
In addition, although Anthony sold genuine Miller
products bearing the registered Miller trademark rather
than an imitation or counterfeit product, the court held
that Anthony's failure to follow Miller's quality controls
rendered the product not genuine. Thus, the court found
Anthony's sale of Miller's products without following
the quality controls to be an infringement of Miller's
registered trademark. The court also held that by
suffering damage to their registered trademark, an
intangible asset, Miller suffered damage to property.
Therefore, the court found the "economic loss rule"
inapplicable and allowed Miller's fraud claims to stand.
However, the court denied Miller's unjust enrichment
claim pursuant to the "economic loss rule," noting that
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